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VOL. III.

LEXINGTON, Ky., NOVEMBER, 1914.

No. 2

MAY AN ATHEIST TESTIFY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF KENTUCKY?
By BASIL DUKE SARTIN"

May an Atheist testify under the Constitution of Kentucky?
The belief by the witness in a Supreme Being, wbich was ess'ential to the competency of the testimony at common law, was held by
the Court of Appeals to be abrogated by the Constitution of Kentucky and by the Civil Practice Code of the State, in the cases of
Bush vs. Com. 8o Ky. 244, L. & N. R. R. vs. Mayes, 8o S. W. io96,
Bright vs. Corn. 86 S. W. 527.
It may be well here to consider the ruling of the court in the case
of Bush vs. Com. The question arose on this state of fact. The Commonwealth offered C. C. Moore as a witness, and objection to his
being sworn was made by the counsel for the accused, who stated that
he could prove that Moore was an atheist, did not believe in any god
or future state of rewards and punishments or in any state of accountability hereafter. The objection was overruled by the court and the
witness being interrogated stated that he believed it was morally
wrong to tell a lie, and that he recognized the obligation of his oath
in every sense of the word. On appeal from the Circuit Court of
Fayette County, Judge Hines, delivering the opinion of the court,
said:
"It is admitted that the modern common law requires as a
condition precedent to the admission of the testimony of a witness, that he believe in a supreme being, who will punish here or
hereafter, one who swears falsely; that the objection should be
made before he is sworn, and that the alleged disbelief should be
established by the testimony of such persons as may have heard
the proposed witness declare his opinion on these matters, and
not by the witness himself. In the time of Lord Coke it was
held that no one but a Christian was a competent witness, but
this rule was modified until a belief in the existence of a supreme
being who will punish false swearing either in this world or in the
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life to come, is held sufficient. Now by statute in England and in
the most of the states of the United States either by statute or
by reason of constitutional provisions, religious belief does not
disqualify. The unquestioned tendency of modern legislation
as well as judicial interpretation, is to the exclusion of inquiry
into religious belief as a test of the competency of a witness. In
this State, legislation in civil cases at least has kept pace with this
tendency, so that by virtue of the provisions of the Civil Code,
no religious test can be applied. Under that code every person,
subject to certain exceptions, of which this is not one, is competent to testify, unless he be found by the court incapable of understanding the facts concerning which his testimony is offered,
and when the witness is conscientiously opposed to taking an
oath, he may affirm. (See. 605-680, Civil Code). In the Criminal
Code, however, there are no such provisions, and therefore, in the
administration of criminal and penal law, the rules of evidence
recognized at common law are still in force unless changed or
abrogated by the organic law as expressed in the Constitution.
Upon this point under consideration, we are of the opinion that
the Constitution changes the common law rule, and makes competent as witnesses all persons so far as any religious test is
concerned. The fifth and sixth sections of the Bill of Rights,
when construed together, seem to cover the exact case under consideration."
Itis unnecessary to notice further the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this proposition, for it is well established and settled in the
mind of the eourt. But here is where the Court of Appeals has fallen
into error. It has taken the statute and Constitution for their face
value and not in th-e light of the evil they were enacted to remedy.
It is a fundamental rule of construction that any statute is to be construed in the light of the common law and to be read in harmony
.with the common law if possible. It is only to abrogate the weil
established custom of the common law when it is clear from the context and language, spirit and reason, and consequences of the statute
that such an idea was intended. Before we can find the true meaning
and construction of the statute of religious liberty embodied in section
4 of the present Bill of Rights, it will be necessarv to know its history,
the object it had in view to accomplish, and the evil it was to remedy.
This makes it necessary for us to go back to Virginia and note religious conditions there before Kentucky became a state and had a
constitution.
Prior to 1785. the State of Virginia had a State Church. The
House of Delegates of Virginia made assessment on the people of
the State to support this church. Not only did the State Church receive support from the people by the way of money, levied in form of
taxes, but the State conferred upon the church particular and peculiar
privileges.
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This was intolerable and disgusting to the Presbyterians, Baptists, and other denominations, who appealed to the House of Delegates for statutes of relief. The Legislature of Virginia was forced
by the increasing demand of the various churches to pass the famous
statute of Religious Liberty, which was drafted by Thomas Jefferson,
then a member of the House of Delegates of Virginia.
Many states caught the inspiration from Virginia and drafted the
statute of religious liberty in their state constitutions. Later, Congress of the United States was denied the power to erect a religious
establishment of any kind and to secure this provision it was embodied
in the Federal Constitution, thus forever divorcing the State and
the Church.
The following extract from Davidson's History of the Presbyterians of Kentucky, will give much light and insight into the religious
sentiment as it existed in the State of Virginia and which was afterwards to blaze the way for religious liberty not only in that state
but in Kentucky and the United States:
"The Presbyterians of Virginia, like the rest of their brethren, were marked by an inextinguishable love of liberty, and
during the Revolution were staunch Republicans to a man. After
the very first meeting of the Presbytery at Hanover, after the
Declaration of Ind'epcndence, that body addressed a memorial to
the Virginia House of Delegates, identifying themselves with
the common cause, and urging the establishment of religious as
well as civil freedom. It was signed by Rev. John Todd, moderator, and Caleb Wallace, clerk. In 1777 they presented another, drafted by Rev. S. S. Smith and Rev. David Rice, and
signed by Rev. Shankley, moderator, and in May, 1784, a third
drafted by -Messrs. Smith and Waddel. At this time the danger
being imminent for a general ass'essment for the support of religion, a scheme which was advocated by Patrick Henry and
other popular politicians, a convention was held at Bethel in Augusta, August 13. 1785, of Presbyterian ministers and laymen,
who prepared an adverse petition signed by ten thousand persons. The Rev. John Todd was chairman, and Daniel McCalla,
clerk. This petition and a fourth m'emorial from the Presbytery
in October of the same year, were presented to the Legislature by
the Rev. John Blair Smith (whos-e hand writing the papers
show), who was heard for three consecutive days at the bar of
the House in support of them. The main object of all these
petitions was to complain of the partial and peculiar privileges
still continued to the Episcopal, late the established church, and
its vestrymen; to discountenance a general incorporation of the
clergy alone, of other sects as well as of the Episcopalians, and
to deprecate the plan for a general assessment for the support
of religion. The bill was already engrossed for a third reading,
when these strenuous measures arrested further progress, and
on the sixteenth of December, 1785, an act was passed for estab-

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
lishint full religious freedom, the spirit and phraseology of which
exhibit a striking coincidence with the tone of the memorials
just described.
"Thus it appears that it was not to Mr. Jefferson or any
other politician that Virginia is indebted for the religious liberties she enjoys, for if no opposition had been made, extremely
pernicious schemes would have been riveted on the people; it
was through the firm. and untiring exertions of the Presbyterians in common with the Baptists and other denominations, that
the churches were sundered from all connections with the civil
power and placed on an equal footing. The example of Virginia being found successful in practice, was imitated by Maryland, Delaware, Georgia, the Carolinas, and last by Massachusetts,
in which latter state, the old Congregational Establishment was
not overthrown until 1830. So decided was the influence of the
struggle in Virginia, as to procure the perpetual withholding
from the Federal Constitution, all power to erect a religious establishment of any kind."
The following extract from Collins' History of Kentucky will
also give much aid to one desiring to know the true condition and
facts which were under the foundation of our first constitution. These
evils were predominant in the Mother State, Virginia, and were so
obnoxious that Kentucky, when framing her first constitution, determined to make this protection an eternal part of her organic law.
"The history of the Episcopal Church in Kentucky can not
be understood without some knowledge of the same church as it
existed in Virginia, during that period when Kentucky was a
part of that ancient Commonwealth. The early settlement of
Virginia was with a distinct Christian purpose--the preaching
of the Gospel to the heathen nations. This is prominently set
forth in all the constitutions and charters under which that settlement was made. The church with her faiths, her sacraments,
and a part of her ministry, was an integral part of the colonization of the state from the beginning and continuously. Everywhere with the spreading population, substantial edifices for public worship were erected and a competent provision made for the
maintenance of all the decencies and proprieties of the Christian
religion. Th-e influence of these institutions and of the faiths
which they embodied was most benign and salutary. They gave
to the Age of the Revolution its noble character and its deepseated principles, the force and momentum of which have come
down, with gradual decreasing power, to our own day. But with
these instituticns and with their proper effect and influence, was
mingled the fatal leaven of secularity.
"According to the theory of the Episcopal Church, the ministry as well as the church itself, is of Divine institution, and derives all its power and capacities for good from the Divine appointment. But the rulers of the state in England did not see the
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use of the compliance with this appointment of God in the new
planting of the Church in America. They undertook to dispense
with the most essential part of the Divine institution-the Episcopate. It is true that the Episcopate was nominalIy continued
as a part of the constitution of the church in this country, by
making the whole of the North American Colonies a part of the
Diocese of London. But thus far its practical influence was little
better than a mockery of the Divine institution in the regard of
this church. Besides towards the close of the seventeenth, and
throughout the whole of the eighteenth centuries, religion was at
a low ebb in England as .inall Christendom. Almost as a matter
of course under such circumstances, the ministers who came to
this country, with some high and honorable exceptions, consisted
for the most part of those who, unable to obtain a living at home,
consented to go into banishment in the colonies. What else
could have been expected from such a clergy without Episcopal
supervision-without any sort of control but that public opinion
which they were to form-but the looseness of manners and the
coldness and vapidness of doctrine which history and tradition
tell us were characteristic of so large a proportion of the clergy."
This gives us an idea of the kind of men who were sent to the
colonies by Great Britain to govern the State Church. No wonder
the people of Virginia were loath to support such idle, ignorant and
hypocritical clergy. The spark of civil freedom which had gained
ground in the wilderness of North America was thus fanned into a
blaze, the 'effulgence of which was to form a religious freedom, a liberty that runs hand in hand with civil freedom. Hence in 1791,
when the delegates in the constitutional convention assembled for the
purpose of drafting a constitution for Kentucky, it was deemed necessary to 'enact into the Bill of Rights a sufficient guaranty of religious
freedom. Therefore, the convention embodied this section in the
K-entucky constitution:
"That no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or
support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry against
his consent; that no human authority can in any case whatever,
control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no
preference shall ever be given by law to any religious societies
or modes of worship. That the civil rights, privileges, or capacities of any citizen shall in no wise be diminished or enlarged on
account of his religion."
The object of the above section in the Kentucky constitution was
to prevent the religious disturbances of Virginia from ever occurring
in Kentucky. The fram&rs knew the evils which might be riveted
upon the people of Kentucky and endeavored to prevent it by th'e
statute of religious freedom. In order to get the true purpose of the
above section, and to know exactly its application, one should know
that the purpose of the above section was to separate civil and relig-
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ious rights, not to give the atheist any privileges, but to prevent one
"churchman" from "enjoying privileges not common to all "churchmen." In other words the state was to be henceforth and forever inpartial to all "churchmen," not atheist. There never was an issue
between the atheist and the clergy. The contention was among the
"churchmen." Therefore th-e above section can only have reference
to believers. No atheist or infidel can claim protection under our constitution by virtue of the above section. The statute was enacted to
bestow equal rights and privileges upon all "churchmen" and not to
place believers and unbelievers upon the same basis.
Here is where the Kentucky Court of Appeals fell into error. It
failed to construe our constitution in the light of the evil it endeavored to remedy-conjunction of state and church. The court in construing the above section, held that an atheist could testify, and could
not be questioned regarding his religious belief. This is an inconsistency within itself, to hold an atheist may testify, and yet require
him to take an oath prior to giving his testimony.
It is true that in 1793 there was a great storm of infidelity sweeping over the states of Virginia and Kentucky. This was due to the
French Revolution and the form of infidelity it was trying to estabish. It is reported that avarice, crime, corruption and infidelity
seemed to be invading the whole land. The following extract from
Davidson's History of Kentucky will confirm the above statement:
"A Democratic society was organized in Philadelphia, in
imitation. of the Jacobin Club, and affiliated societies soon sprang
up in Lexington, Georgetown, and Paris, in 1793. The character of these clubs were violent and dogmatical. They warmly
advocated an alliance with France, and sided with Citizen Genet,
minister of the French Republic, in his attempts to embroil the
country in a war with Spain, in spite of the President's proclamation of neu.trality; to enter into the political details would be
foreign to our design. They are only mentioned as they reflect
light on the popular feeling in relation to religion; for unhappily
the French mania brought about a leaning to French infidelity,
of which Mr. Jefferson, who was idolized as a friend of the West,
a Virginian, a philosopher, and a leader in securing religious
liberty in the old Dominion, was a notorious patron. The first
demonstration of hostility to the Christian religion was the dispensing with the services of chaplain to the Legislature, in 1793,
in opposition to the previous practices. Another decisive measure was the effecting a revolution in Transylvania Seminary, and
placing at its head a disciple of Priestly. This man. Harry Toulmin, who, two years afterwards, 1796, elevated by Governor
Garrard (himself an apostate Baptist preacher) to the office of
Secretary of State. Such was the indifference of the public sentiment, that his appointment to so important position was witnessed without an expression of displeasure from any quarter of
the country. By the close of the century a decided majority of
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the people were reputed to be infidels and as infidelity is the
prolific parent of vice, it is not surpri .gig to find that the whole
country was remarkable for vice and dissipation. A salutary
change took place, however, in sessions of the Legislatures. In
the year of 1843, the practice of opening the daily sessions of the
Legislature with prayer wps resumed; and in the year of 1845,
the example was followed by the legislatures of Tennessee and
Ohio. In 1844, for the first time, the custom of an Annual Day
of Thanksgiving was introduced by Governor Owsley."
Although this remarkable change had taken place since the
drafting of Kentucky's first constitution, yet when the second constitutional convention met in i8oo. the people were not dissatisfied
with the constitutional protection of their religious liberty. The entire statute of religious liberty as existed in the first constitution was
embodied verbatim in the second. Again when the third constitutional convention was called in 1850, the statute of religious liberty
was again preserved without change or mutilation. Also when the
fourth constitutional convention was called in I89O, the famous
statute again was only paraphrased.
Although it may be admitted that many of the old words which
were handed down in the first, second, and third constitutions of
Kentucky were changed, or rather their thought paraphrased, when
the fourth constitution was adopted. It can not be disputed or controverted that the constitutional delegates intended only a paraphrase
and not any material change. This idea was clearly expressed by
many of the delegates on the floor of the House.
The following are extracts from speeches of some of the delegates in the last constitutional convention. Mr. Auxier, speaking in
reference to changing the Bill of Rights, said:
"There are more important things to discuss than the Bill
of Rights. As I have stated at the outset, it would -not make a
bit of difference, where we have a written constitution, if we
leave out the Bill of Rights. Those rights will exist as unalterable as the laws of the Medes and Persians, and as unchangeable, whether we adopt them as part of our constitution or not."
Mr. Cox, when speaking in reference to the Bill of Rights, said:
"But, sir, much has been said in this discussion, about the
style, the language in which the present Bill of Rights was
handed down to us, which declare the almost sacred principle
of civil and religious liberty. While I desire to see Section 2
greatly changed, and Section 3 omitted from the Bill of Rights
which we will adopt, and some other changes made in other
sections, yet I do not desire to see the language in which that
Bill of Rights was handed down to us changed only where
changes are absolutely necessary. I am now convinced that the
old Bill of Rights will be adopted with but few changes, such as
the o.inion of the courts and experience have made necessary."
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Likewise Mr. Kennedy, when speaking on the Bill of Rights,
said:
"Great changes have taken place since our present constitution was formed, and just as a healthy, vigorous boy outgrows his clothes, so we in some respects have outgrown our
fundamental law and it is our privilege, living under a republican
form of government, to so change and alter it as that it shall
conform to our present requirements as well as to our possible
future necessities. But we have not outgrown that part of it
contained in our present Bill of Rights. Whoever heard of any
one being dissatisfied with our present Bill of Rights until we
came down to Frankfort? Show me a single instance, with the
exception of the first section, where it has not afforded an ample
protection and security. Why leave the old familiar path we
have trod so long, while its bearing has been in the right direction all the while ?"
Again Mr. Beckham, speaking in reference to the present Bill of
Rights as compared to the old Bill of Rights, said:
"Is it possible that the people of Kentucky sent us here as
a set of mere sciolists, to transpose terms and paraphrase language? What religious right is guaranteed to the people of
Kentucky by this transposition of terms that is not in this Section 5 of the old Bill of Rights? Can the gentleman tell us
one? I am not here to offer captious opposition to the report of
the committee, but I do feel when a section like this, a hundred
years old, almost in the exact language it is now, that the convention ought to have some reason for changing the language
before doing it."
Thus it is clear that no change or alteration in the statute of
liberty, as originally adopted in Kentucky, has been made, nor was
there ever any intention to that effect throughout the history of Kentucky during the frequent and various draftings of her constitutions.
In our last constitutional -convention, 189o, the committee on
Preamble and Bill of Rights reported the following sections as the
guaranty to religious freedom to take the place of the statute of religious liberty as embodied in the old constitution:
"No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any
place of worship or maintain any ministry against his consent; no
human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and no preference shall
ever be given by law to any religious societies, denominations or
modes of worship. But the liberty of conscience hereby secured
shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations; excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with
the good order, peace oraiety of the state; or opposed to the
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civil authority thereof. The civil rights, privileges and capacities of any person shall in no wise be diminished or enlarged on
account of his religion."
Notice that the committee had no intention of dispensing with
oaths or affirmations; for it expressly stated so in the provision. The
report of the Committee on Preamble and the Bill of Rights was rejected and the following amendment was received instead, which,
with a few modifications, stands today in our present constitution:
"No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious
sect, society or denomination; nor to any particular creed, mode
of worship or system of ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person be compelled to attend any place of worship, or obligated
against his own consent, to contribute to the erection or maintenance of any such place, or to the salary or support of any
minister of religion whatever; but all persons shall be protected
in their right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates
of their own consciences; and the civil rights, privileges, or ca.
pacities of no person shall be taken away, or in any wise be
diminished or enlarged, on account of his belief or disbelief of any
religious tenet, dogma, or teaching whatsoever."
The reason for the substitution, however, was not that the convention desired to dispense with oaths or affiliations, but because the
delegates considered the provision unnecessary, knowing that the
administering of an oath or affirmation was already established in
our law.
Mr. Allen, a member of the constitutional convention, when
speaking on the committee's section and the above substitute, said:
"Do you catch what is in the committee's bill that is not in
the substitute? The latter part of the committee's section was
aimed at what is now called Mormonism. Do you wish to forbid it in Kentucky? Do you wish to invite it by not prohibiting
it? If so, take the substitute. If, on the contrary, you wish to
send to Utah an invitation to the Mormons, vote down this denial; vote up the substitute, which gives them the privilege of
coming here and establishing themselves within the Commonwealth of Kentucky. I submit it to the intelligence of this convention that the committee's article is superior in every way to
that of the substitute."
Again Mr. Askew, in speaking on the report of the committee
on the Bill of Rights relative to religious freedom, said:
"Down to the word 'worship' that is the same as the section of the old Bill of Rights; but Section 5 has been mutilated
by taking out the first few words and putting them in the constellation; but they add: 'But the liberty of conscience hereby
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secured shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations, excused acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with good order,' etc.
"Well now that reads pretty good, but I don't know why it
was put in there. In course of debate, they say if that was not
put in there we might look for an influx of Mormons. I believe that the temperature of this latitude, the conditions of life
and our views of what is right, are the best protection against
Mormons; the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of some very stringent anti-Mormon legislation
out in their territory.
Thus it appears that Mr. Allen thought it necessary as a protection against Mormons to embody a clause to that effect in the Bill of
Rights; yet Mr. Askew voiced the sentiment of the convention when
he declared it was unnecessary, that a sufficient guaranty existed in
public opinion. Therefore the provision was stricken from the committee's report. The provision regarding oaths and affirmations was
also omitted for the same reason. The following remark from Mr.
Beckham will show the truth of the above statement:
"I would like to know what power her means to give, if any
power, by the insertion of these words, 'But the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense with
oaths or affirmations,' and if he means by these words to leave
the power in tie legislators that it has not under the constitution as it now is ?"
The above question was directed to Mr. Rodes, who was chairman of the Committee on Preamble and Bill of Rights. The following reply was given by Mr. Rodes to the question of Mr. Beckham:
"I think all understand what we mean by Bill of Rights. If
it is not in the Bill of Rights or in the Constitution, then it becomes subject to legislative discretion; and if it is in the Constitution it becomes permanent; it resides there because the
people have settled in their minds that it ought to stay there, and
it can not be tossed about like a football according tc the caprice of any legislature. Now I ask the gentleman, and I do so
in all respect, do you say we shall dispense with oaths or affirmations? No; you will not. I know you will not, or that we will
excuse acts of licentiousness. No, I know you will not say that.
Do you say that we ought to tolerate for one moment, much less
for all time to come, ad infinitum. any more than we have from
time immemorial, practices inconsistent with the good order,
peace or safety of the State, or opposed to the civil authorities
thereof? No, you will not say that, but we will say that those
principles are golden, those letters must be written in our constitution, and made just as permanent and golden and strong as
we can stamp them upon paper."
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This shows conclusively that no intention was ever shown by the
convention to abolish oaths in judicial proceedings, or to abrogate
the common law rules of religious belief which was essential to the
competency of a witness.
The idea that the constitution of Kentucky dispenses with oaths
or affirmation is wholly unfounded, for the first constitution prescribed for the administration of an oath in five different occasions. Not
only the first constitution, but the succeeding constitutions have enacted into their provisions many reuqirements for taking and administering an oath. This shows that the constitution never contemplated the abolition of an oath and never thought of disturbing religious
belief, but made it a prerequisite to giving testimony. This idea is
clearly made known in the "Debates of the Constitutional Convention."
As has been said, the fourth constitutional convention made attempts at paraphrasing the statute of liberty. It would be gross
error, however, to suppose that the convention intended to establish
political infidelity by encouraging it in the state constitution. Records
show that the delegates of the fourth constitutional convention were
peculiarly reverent of a Supreme Being, a Maker and Unmaker of
empires and nations. The preamble to the Bill of Rights is conclusive on this point. Notice the recognition: "We, the people of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, grateful to the Almighty God for the
civil, political and religious liberty we do enjoy, and invoking a continuance of these blessings, do ordain and establish this constitution."
No where in a previous preamble to any constitution of Kentucky is so expressed a fact of the dependence of a state upon an
Omniscient Being, who presides over the destinies of man and state.
The preamble clearly indicates the frame of mind of the delegates to
the last constitutional convention. Instead of irreligious, profane,
or blasphemous men in the convention, we learn that they were very
vise statesmen; men cognizant of their insignificence, as well as sensitive to the power and authority of the Maker of the universe. No
where can be found in our Constitution or laws the lack of faith in
the state of a Supreme Ruler of nations. Then how can the court
come to the conclusion that by indefinite language the delegates to
the constitutions intended to enforce upon the state political infidelity?
The following requirement of the law will suffice to show that the
State (prior to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, and even this provision is maintained and practiced today) has never thought that the
constitution intended to dispense with religious belief as a prerequisite to giving testimony.
The State has enacted the crime of perjury. This impliedly
recognizes the obligation of an oath, for without the oath the crime
could not exist. The following extract from Chitty's Blackstone
Book IV., 137.
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"Perjury is defined by Sir Edward Coke to be a crime committed when a lawful oath is administered in some judicial proceedings to a person who swears wilfully, absolutely and falsely
in a matter material to the issue or point in question. The law
takes no notice of any perjury but such as is committed in some
court of justice, having power to administer an oath or before
some magistrate or proper officer invested with a similar authority, or in some proceedings relative to a civil suit or criminal prosecution; for it esteems all other oaths unnecessary at
least and therefore will not punish the breach of them. For
which reason it is much to be questioned how far any magistrate
is justifiable in taking a voluntary affidavit in any extra judicial
matters, as it is now too frequent upon every petty occasion;
since it is more than possible, that by such idle oaths a man
may frequently, in foro conscientiae, incur the guilt and at the
same time evade the temporal penalty of perjury.
"And no breach of an oath made in a mere private concern,
as entering into a contract, however malicious, is an indictable
offense, but can only be redressed in an action for individual injury; nor can any criminal proceeding be maintained for the
violation of an oath, however solemn, to perform any duties in
the future, though the offense will be highly aggravated by the
breach of an obligation so sacred. And teven when an oath is
required by an act of Parliament in an extra-judicial proceeding,
the breach of that obligation does not seem to amount to perjury, unless the statute contains an express provision to that
effect. And it seems that an indictment for perjury is not sustainable on an oath taken before the House of Commons as
they have not the power to administer an oath, unless in deed
in those particular cases, in which an express power is granted
to them by statute."
Again false swearing is a statutory offense, which also recognizes
the obligation of an oath; furthermore, thie statute requires a witness
to swear or affirm. before giving testimony (Civil Code of practice,
Section 68o) and moreover to show the absurdity in supposing the
state recognizes political infidelity, it requires the sheriff when calling the court to order, to exclaim: "Oh yes; silence is commanded,
etc.," and concludes by saying "God Save the Commonwealth."
These facts, as well as the history of religious freedom of Kentucky,
show conclusively that it was never intended by the .legislature, nor
by -the constitution, to dispense with the taking of an oath prior to
testifying in a judicial proceeding.
The taking of an oath as prerequisite to giving testimony, is a
process old as our law; it was known to the Greeks and Romans, as
well as by all people whose religion taught them of a god, the Rewarder of Truth and the"Avenger of a Falsehood; for this reason it
was thought necessary in order to get the truth in the investigation,
to call the attention of the witness to God. This placing of the wit-
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ness, as it were, in the presence of God, was considered the greatest
sanction of truth. The testimony of a witness was considered
dangerous to the rights of the accused, when it was sanctioned
by an oath. Human experience found this rule of competency
absolutely necessary for a guaranty to truth. This principal of
law is so deep seated in our common law that it needs no elucidation or explanation. But it will be proper here to remark that customs so well established in the law of mankind, should not, nor
will not be changed, modified or abrogated by hasty and thoughtless
legislation, unless such intention is unmistakably set forth, not only
in works and context, but also in spirit and reason, as well as in the
consequences. Every statute must be construed in the light of the
common law and must be read in harmony of the common law, only
abrogating the well established customs when it is the clear intent
of the legislature to depart from the old beaten path. Common sense
teaches us to give a construction to a statute in derogation of the well
established customs of man without first knowing the purpose of the
statute and the evil it is to remedy, would be utter folly and foolishness. Of this gross error the Court of Appeals has been guilty in
construing the statute or religious liberty in the Constitution of Kentucky.
Here is where the court falls into error. It holds an atheist or
infidel may testify, yet it requires him to give an oath. This is a
great inconsistency, for one who does not believe in God can not take
an oath. The definition of an oath, following, will show the truth of
the above statement (Section 327, Greenleaf on Evidence, 15th edition):
"The common law has followed the common experience of
mankind. It rejects the testimony of persons insensible to the
obligation of an oath. But here it is proper to observe that one
of the main provisions of the law, for securing the purity and
truth of oraL evidence, is, that it be delivered under the sanction
of an oath. The administration of an oath supposes that ha
moral and religious accountability is felt to a Supreme Being,
and this the sanction which the l.wv requires upon, the conscience, before it admits him to testify. Accordingly an oath has
been well defined by a certain writer to be 'an outward pledge,
given by the juror (or person taking it) that his attestation or
promise, is made tinder an immediate sense of his responsibility
to God; a security to this extent, for the truth of testimony, is
all that the law seems .to have deemed necessary; and with less
security than this, it is believed that the purpose of justice can
not be accomplished.'"
Again Mr. Greenleaf says in Section 368 of his book on Evidence:
"Another class of persons incompetent to testify as witness consists of those who are insensible to the obligation of
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an oath, from defect of religious sentiment and belief. The ver)
nature of an oath, it being a religious and most solemn appeal
to God, as a Judge of all men, presupposes that the witness believes in the existence of an omniscient Supreme Being, who is
the rewarder of truth and the avenger of falsehood; and that,
by such a formal appeal, the conscience of the witness is affected. Without this belief the person can not be subject to that
sanction, which the law deems an indispensable test of truth.
As to the nature and degree of religious faith required of a
witness, the rule of law as at present understood, seems to be
this, that the person is competent to testify if he believes in the
being of a god, and a future state of reward and punishment;
that the Divine punishment will be the certain consequence of
perjury. It may be considered as now generally settled in this
country, that it is not material whether the witness believes that
the punishment will be inflicted in this world or the next. It is
enough if he has the religious sense of accountability to the Omniscient Being, who is invoked by an oath."
2, I Stark Evi. 22; see also Hughes on Evi. Sec.
In the case of Omichund vs. Barker, i Atk. 21, an atheist was

See also Note
115.

held incompetent as a witness; as said by Justice Wilde: "It would
indeed seem absurd to administer to a witness an oatli, containing a
solemn appeal for the truth of his testimony, to a Being in whose
existence he has no belief."
For further authority on this point see Bouvier Law Dictionary,
Tyler Oaths 15; Attorney General vs. Bradlaugh, 142 B. D. 667. Let
us notice Section 7, present Bill of Rights Kentucky Constitution,
and see if it does not throw some light on the requirement of an oath.
Likewise let us notice and see if this provision will harmonize with
the construction given to Section 4 of the Bill of Rights. Section 7
of Bill of Rights, Constitution of Kentucky:
"The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and
the right thereof iemain inviolate, subject to such modifications
as may be authorized by this constitution."
Thus we see that the trial by jury is a constitutional right of
every citizen of Kentucky. The framers of the constitution considered trial by jury as an essential protection to the inalienable rights
of man. Hence they declared that it should remain sacred, and the
rights thereof remain inviolate. Not only trial by jury remained inviolate but the "Ancient Mode" of trial by jury, shall remain inviolate, subject to certain exceptions, etc. Since we learned that the
trial by jury is guaranteed to the people of Kentucky, let us pause
a few moments and inquire in what does a trial by jury consist. In
the words of Mr. Justice Gray in the Capitol Traction Co. vs. Hoff,
we learn:
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"Trial by jury in the primary and usual sense of the term at
common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a
trial by jury by twelve men before an officer vested with authority to cause them to be summoned and impaneled, to administer oaths to them, and to the constable in charge, and to
enter judgment and issue execution on their verdict; but it is a
trial by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and under the
superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the
law, and to advise them on the facts (except an acquittal on a
criminal charge) to set aside their verdict, if in his opinion it
is against the law or the evidence. This proposition has been
so generally admitted and so seldom contested that there has
been little occasion for its distinct assertion. Yet there are unequivocal statements of it to be found in the books."
This definition of trial by jury can be found in unequivocal statements in many other cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court, as well as by the House of Lords of England. Many text
books likewise uphold this definition given by Mr. Justice Gray.
Hence we learn that a citizen of Kentucky has not only a trial by the
peers of his land guaranteed to him by our State Constitution, but is
entitled to have all the incidents of the ancient mode of trial by jury
whenever his rights are violated.
One instance of a trial 1.y jury as defined by Mr. Gray, is the
power of the judge who presides over the court to cause the jury to
be sworn, etc. Therefore, instead of the constitution abrogating the
common law rule of religious belief as a precedent condition to giving testimony, we find that the constitution has impliedly made constitutional the common law requirement. This is only one of the
many indications showing that the constitution never intended to
dispense with belief in some Supreme Being, who is a rewarder of
truth and the avenger of falsehood, as a precedent condition to
testify in a judicial proceding. Therefore, I maintain that the comAnon law rule of competency of witnesses is now in force in Kentucky, so far as the Constitution of Kentucky is concerned, and
hence an atheist is an incompetent witness in this State.

A big corn-fed lawyer of Alabama, in pleading a case. said:
"Your honor, Judge, the evidence in this is prima facia absurdum,
ad reducto."
His partned remraked to him in a whisper, "You mean reducto
adsurdum."
"Yes," said the big husky country lawyer, "My friend here says
it is also a reducto adsurdum."

